Inflation and the economic recovery by Roger W. Spencer
HE recovery is solid. That unfortu-
nate combination of falling output and
rising rates of price increase which
characterized the latest recession has
been sharply reversed. There remains
sufficient capacity for output gains to
continue for some time, but many ob-
servers are monitoring price data and
policymakers’ actions closely for any
signs which might foreshadow a re-
sumption of inflationary pressures.
This article first compares the current
recovery to others in the recent past and
then describes the two chief factors re-
sponsible for the economic progress ob-
served heretofore:moderate stabilization
policies and the absence of adverse
structural shocks. The interaction of
these factors with inflation and infla-
tionary expectations is analyzed in the
final section of the article. It is argued
that the abatement of inflation and in-
ROGER W. SPENCER
Table I
Comparison of Output, Employment and Price Dota in
Recent Recession and Early-Recovery Periods
(Annual Rates of Change)
Industi al Real Payroll GNP
Productian Product Employ ment Deflator
RECESSION’
111/57 . 11/58 14.5°/a 3.4% - 5.3% 0.9%
11/60 - I/al -- 7.3 0.4 2.3 0.6
IV/69 - IV/70 6.1 0.6 —0.8 5.1
lV/73 - 11/75 8.9 -4.0 --- 1.3 9.6
RECOVERY
2
11/58 . /59 20.2 8.6 4.7 2.3
1/61 - V/al 15.1 7.4 2.8 1.4
IV/70 - 111/71 3.5 5.0 1.5 5.1
11/75. 1/76 12.6 8.4 3.4 5.8
TOTAL PERIOD
111/57 - /59 1.4 2.4 --0.4 1.6
11/60. IV/61 3.3 3.4 0.2 1.0
IV/69 - 111/71 2.1 1.8 0.2 5.1
IV/73 - 1/76 - 2.2 0 0.3 8.3
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Inflation and the Economic Recovery
flationary expectations is an important element in increases in the cost of energy, liquidity crises and
assessing the likelihood of long-lasting economic political turmoil, exceptional monetary and fiscal stim-
prosperity. uli would have to be applied to get the economy
turned around. Growth rates of the money supply
TIlE RECOVERY TO DATE (Ml) of 10 to 15 percent were advocated as a de-
sirable stimulant to economic activity.1 Such actions
Up to the present time, the economic recovery, were never taken and yet the recovery has moved
although not exceptional when measured against other smoothly into high gear.
recovery periods, has been stronger than anticipated
by most analysts. Only a short time ago, it was See, for example, 11. S. Congress, Hearings Before the Joint
claimed in many quarters that because of the severe Economic Committee, The 1975 Economic Report of the President, 94th Cong., 1st sess., February 5, 6, 7 and 14,
shocks dealt to the economy in the form of unexpected 1975, p. 548.
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Table I indicates that output and employment in-
creased rapidly over the past three quarters, about in
line with similar periods following earlier recessions.
The rebound has been more vigorous than following
the 1969-70 recession, and roughly similar to the first
three quarters following the two earlier recessions.
Employment gains have been sufficiently strong
relative to labor force growth to push the unemploy-
ment rate down from a high of 8.9 percent in May
1975 to the 7.3 percent rate observed one year later.
Industrial production growth, which has been most
pronounced in the consumer goods area, has been
steady but unspectacular throughout the recovery.
Reported capacity utilization of major materials rose
from 70.9 percent last spring to 80.7 percent in the
first quarter of this year.
Prices have increased at a more rapid rate in this
recovery than in others. Only the 5.1 percent rate of
increase in the first three quarters following the 1970
recession is at all comparable to the 5.8 percent rate
of increase in the three quarters ending first quarter
1976. Of course, prices rose at a far more rapid pace
during the latest recession than during others. Note
also the 8.3 percent rate of increase of prices over
























The recovery has not been unusual in terms of the
pattern of growth of most economic sectors. Con-
sumer spending has provided much of the good
economic news since early 1975. Retail sales, espe-
cially automobile sales, have been impressive. Yet, as
indicated in Table II, consumption for the latest total
recession and recovery period has not increased quite
as rapidly as in any other comparable period.
Government spending has not expanded by an ex-
ceptional amount relative to previous recession/re-
covery periods. The Table indicates that housing ex-
penditures, although increasing at a moderate pace
in the latest recovery, remain far below spending
levels reported in 1973. Plant and equipment ex-
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penditures, which picked up considerably in the first
quarter of 1976, have been weaker over the latest
total recession/recovery period than in any other
period, with the exception of 1957-59.
SOURCES OF THE RECOVERY
In every recovery there are normal cyclical forces
which support the upward impetus given the econ-
omy by outside, or exogenous, forces. For example,
if the recession has been a severe one, many key
workers such as foremen and skilled tradesmen would
have lost their jobs. As the economic situation im-
proves, however, these individuals generally will be
the first to be rehired, and will make significant con-
tributions to the production process. The same is true
of equipment. The best, most efficient equipment
will be the last to stop running as the recession
deepens, but the first to be brought back into opera-
tion as the upswing begins. In short, the nature of
the business cycle itself is conducive to increased
productivity, efficiency, and output in the early stages
of a business upturn.
Apart from cyclical forces, there are two major
factors which have contributed to the latest upturn
in economic activity: moderately expansive stabiliza-
tion policies and the absence of adverse structural
shocks.
Stabilization Policies
The growth of monetary aggregates
and the level of interest rates are asso-
ciated closely with monetary actions.
The Federal deficit and tax and expendi-
ture functions are representative fiscal
indicators.
Monetary Actions — The monetary
base, the primary determinant of money
supply (Ml) trend growth, has in-
creased at a fairly steady 6 to 8 percent
rate since 1970. However, Ml has fluc-
tuated considerably around its trend
growth in recent years. Changes in the
demand for currency and time deposits
relative to demand deposits have been
chiefly responsible for the fact that Ml
slowed from about a6percent trend
growth to a 3 percent rate from second
quarter 1974 to first quarter 1975, rose
at a 7.4 percent rate over the next two
quarters, and fell to a 2.5 percent rate
of increase in the two quarters ending
first quarter 1976. The latest available
data indicate that growth of both the monetary
base and the money supply have picked up sharply
in recent months.
On balance since the Federal Reserve declared its
one-year target range of Ml growth in March 1975
to be 5 to 7.5 percent, the rate of growth of money
has been near the lower end of the range, increasing
about 5 percent from first quarter 1975 to first quarter
Table 1
Comparison of Selected Spending Components of GNP in
Recent Recession and Early-Recovery Periods




Government Real Rmsidentia I Eq&pment
Spendng consumption St uclures and !tructures
RECESSION
1
111/57- 11/58 6.2% 0.1% 2.7% 16.7%
11/60 - I/al 5.4 0.1 3.8 5.9
IV/69 - IV/70 1.9 0.9 8.7 7.2
lV/73 - 11/75 0.4 0.1 268 11.9
RECOVERY
2
11/58 . 1/59 3.0 6.3 44.9 44
1/61 . IV/61 6.7 4.8 12.8 7.6
IV/70 -111/71 0.1 5.1 53.5 1.8
11/75- /76 3.6 5.3 32.5 5.7
TOTAi_ PERIOD
111/57- /59 4.6 3.0 18.7 . 6.8
11/60 - V/al 6.1 2.3 4.2 0.6
IV/69 - 111/71 1.0 2.7 19.3 . 3.5
IV/73 - 1/76 1.4 1.8 10.8 6.4
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1976. Over the past year the Federal Reserve has
shifted its base periods and targets somewhat, the
latest declared target range being 4.5 to 7 percent
growth from first quarter 1976 to first quarter 1977.
M2 (Ml plus net time deposits) growth, although
subject to some fluctuations, has been close to the
range of 8.5 to 10.5 percent targeted by the Federal
Reserve in March 1975. M2 increased 9.5 percent in
the year ending first quarter 1976, about the same as
its trend rate over the first several years of the cur-
rent decade.
Both long- and short-term interest rates fell un-
evenly from their 1974 peaks, although such rates
have moved up somewhat in recent weeks. The fall in
rates accompanied, to sonic extent, the slowing in
real economic activity in 1974 and the decline in the
rate of inflation which began in 1975. There is little
evidence that the Federal Reserve was actively trying
to push down short-term interest rates through exces-
sive money supply growth during this latest recovery
period. The published records show that for the most
part in 1975, the Federal Reserve adopted policies
in which the Federal funds rate \vas to be kept in a
range consistent with moderate money supply growth.
Fiscal Actions —Last year the Congress instituted
a new budget process designed to bring Federal
spending under closer control. Despite one of the
largest budget deficits in history, many observers
contend that significant progress was made under
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 toward getting
the Congress to approach the budget process in a
broader, more responsible manner than in the piece-
meal fashion which prevailed previously.
In the year ending June 1976, the budget deficit
(on a unified budget basis) is expected to be about
$76 billion. This figure compares with the $43.6 billion
deficit experienced in the preceding year. Currently,
the President and Congress are attempting to set
the budget for fiscal year 1977 which begins October
1, 1976 and runs through September 30, 1977. The
President’s announced expenditure target of $394.2
billion would amount to only a 5.5 percent rise over
the previous year, the smallest year-to-year increase
since 1969. Combined with the President’s expecta-
tions of tax revenues in fiscal year 1977, the expendi-
ture figure, if attained, would give a budget deficit
of about $43 billion.
Congress’ target of $413.3 billion is consistent with
a 10.7 percent growth in expenditures, a figure lower
than the 1975 and expected 1976 percentage increases.
These data do not include expected outlays of about
$98 billion for the “transitional quarter,” a period be-
tween July 1, 1976 and September 30, 1976. Inclusion
of this big jump in expenditures gives fiscal policy a
more expansive look. Moreover, it should be noted
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public attention, have been rising at a rapid rate, and
must be watched more closely than in the past.
Despite the generally perceived trend toward fis-
cal responsibility, there is concern that govermnental
“crowding out” of the private sector will become a
more serious problem as private demand continues
to pick up. One way in which crowding out occurs
is through the capital market route. The govern-
ment’s demand for funds competes with private sec-
tor demands for funds, and those private sectors
which are most responsive to rising market yields
are ~nost likely to be crowded out. Two rather
interest-sensitive sectors are housing and private cap-
ital spending, neither of which has bounced back
from the recession as strongly as anticipated by many
analysts.
StrUCtural Factors
Since August 1971, the economy has been sub-
jected to an unusual series of destabilizing shocks.
Beginning with the imposition of price and wage
controls in August 1971 and going through the recent
liquidity crises of various governmental and non-
governmental organizations, the wide variety of
shocks administered and overcome is a testimonial
to the considerable resiliency of the U. S. economic
system. The reduced frequency of such shocks over
the past year has permitted cyclical and policy forces
to promote the normal recovery so far observed.
Some of these shocks are described below.
Energy — Energy price levels remain high, but
rates of change have about stabilized. The embargo
of autumn 1973 and subsequent four-fold rise in oil
prices adopted by the oi] cartel contributed signifi-
cantly to the one and one-half years of recession.
Prices and employment in and outside the energy
sector were adversely affected for quite some time.
Oil came to cost the United States much more in
terms of currently produced goods and services as
well as in terms of goods and services to be pro-
duced in the future.
An energy bill was passed by Congress and signed
by the President in late 1975. This legislation forced
dow-n prices of some domestically produced oil and
authorized oil dc-regulation to begin in thirty-nine
months. These actions will probably keep oil prices
down briefly, but in the absence of prompt, certain
dc-regulation, will do little to encourage greater do-
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Agriculture — During the period of the recovery,
the food-supplying sector of the U. S. economy be-
gan to recover from a battering series of agricultural
setbacks which occurred for about two years be-
ginning in 1972, Floods, droughts, blizzards, and
other misfortunes combined to foster sharply higher
prices for meats, poultry, grains, soybeans, and fish.
As with the energy situation, most nations of the
world were affected in one way or another by the
unfortunate developments in the food sector.
Although food short-falls promoted huge price in-
creases, these increases in turn encouraged the pro-
duction of more agricultural products. Moreover, un-
like the reaction to oil price increases, government
policies were swiftly altered to stimulate the produc-
tion of more, not less, agricultural products. The sus-
pension of wheat acreage allotments and controls on
meat imports are two examples of such policies. Food
supplies rose so rapidly that wholesale prices of farm
products and processed foods and feeds in May 1976
were actually below the level attained in Novem-
ber 1974.
Mandatory Controls .— The normal and desirable
reaction of the economy to the above shocks would
be changes in relative prices — that is, changes in the
price of an individual commodity relative to the
average price of all other commodities. However, this
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and fear of future, priceand wage controls. Peacetime
price and wage controls were adopted for the first
time in August 1971. For a brief period, the controls
held measured prices and wages below what they
otherwise would have been, but the associated in-
equities and inefficiencies were so great as to require
their removal. The initial positive effects of the con-
trols were soon reversed, as workers and finns at-
tempted to get their wages and profit margins as
high as possible in case another round of controls
were to be instituted. A jump in price levels and
greater unemployment were the predictable results
of the “reverse” wage and price control effort.
The specter of controls, however, has diminished
with each passing month of relative price and wage
stability. Only the Council on Wage and Price Stabil-
ity continues as a reminder, Fortunately, this agency
has been as interested in halting the supply-restric-
tive measures of government organizations as it has
been in directly monitoring wages and prices.
Covernment Regulations — In recent years all busi-
ness organizations have become subject to a growing
maze of government regulations.2 Older agencies,
such as the Interstate Commerce Comnussion, Fed-
eral Communications Commission, and the Federal
Aviation Agency, which regulate specific industries,
have been joined in the past several years by new
agencies whose rulings apply to much broader cate-
2
See Murray L. Weidenbaum, Government-Mandated Price
Increases: A Neglected Aspect of Inflation (Washington,
1). C. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Re-
search, 1975).
gories of business firms. Prominent examples are the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission. Each of these well-
intentioned agencies was created by Congress to cor-
rect a specific problem area, but an undesirable side
effect has been the shift of resources away from the
production of capital and consumer goods and serv-
ices toward the production of regulatory services.
The resources of virtually every firm in the nation
have been affected by the necessity of acquiring
knowledge of each new regulation and the burden
of meeting the increased paper work demands. To
cite three individual cases, there is evidence that: sev-
eral hundred foundries in the United States were
closed over the past few years because they could
not meet EPA and OSHA regulations; the steel in-
dustry will have to allocate more than one-fourth of
its capital expenditures from 1975 to 1983 to pollution
control equipment; firms could be required to invest
about $31 billion to meet the 85 decibel noise level
the EPA has recommended as a maximum limit in
work areas.3 These examples suggest the breadth of
the regulatory shocks to which firms have recently
been and are being subjected. In many cases the costs
to businessmen are passed along to consumers in the
form of higher prices to cover higher resource costs.
The inflationary impact will be even greater in the
future if capital formation is significantly affected.4
Liquidity Crises — The recession sharply accentu-
ated the difficulties of institutions controlled by poor,
corrupt, or “unlucky” management and subject to
cash flow problems. In a short period of time such
major finns as Lockheed, Penn Central, and Equity
Funding either neared or went into bankruptcy.
Frankhn National Bank failed; in fact, 13 banks col-
lapsed in 1975. There had not been more than nine
bank failures in any one year since 1942. In addition,
New York City’s financial plight served to call atten-
tm
See ‘Pollution Control: High Operating Costs Seen Boosting
Steel Price $25 to $30 a Ton by 1983,” Daily Report for
Executives, 14 May 1975, p. A-l3; ~‘Where Overregulation
Can Lead: An Interview with Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum,”
Nation’s Business (June 1975), p. 29; “Regulators: A Rising
Clamor Over Noise Limits,” Business Week, 30 June 1975,
p. 34.
~Leonall C. Andersen, “Is There a Capital Shortage: Theory
and Recent Empirical Evidence” (Paper presented before
the Joint Meeting of the American Finance Association and
the American Economic Association, Dallas, Texas, December
28, 1975). Andersen contends that a negative relation indeed
exists between these types of government regulation and
capital formation,
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tion to the less than robust financial condition of a
large number of state and local governments around
the country.
Fortunately, the recovery has pushed up real prof-
its and equity prices, permitting many finns to avoid
debt-financing while restructuring their asset and
liability positions. Cash flow has also improved sig-
nificantly at the state and local government level, as
tax revenues have improved and governmental bodies
have cut back the rate of expenditure increase. Dire
predictions of the imminent collapse of the U. S. fi-
nancial system have been shown to be premature.
International Economic Developments — Along
with price and wage controls came another shock
in August 1971 — the U. S. Government’s decision to
halt the convertibility of dollars into gold. Subse-
quently, there occurred two official devaluations of
the U. S. dollar, and an international move toward
freely floating exchange rates. The implications of
these developments were further muddled by the
payments problems associated with the oil cartel’s
new-found wealth and the U. S. Government’s deci-
sion to sell gold to private citizens, Given the degree
of change that these events brought to the interna-
tional payments system, fears arose that the world-
wide financial system was on the verge of collapse.
Thus far, the international monetary system has
held up remarkably \vell. Despite the fact that serious
problems remain, the issues regarding gold, flexible
exchange rates, and disposition of oil profits are be-
ing worked out in various markets with surprising
dispatch.
Summary — The policy and structural factors dis-
cussed above combined so as to precipitate the worst
recession in the postwar era. Rapid price increases
during this period contributed to uncertainty and
expectations of further price increases. With the slow-
ing in price increases which began more than a year
ago, many observers have gained confidence in the
durability and strength of the current recovery. The
following section of this article develops the inflation
issue in more detail in order to shed light on the
future course of economic activity.
INFLATION AND INFLATIONARY
EXPECTATIONS
There is an underlying trend of inflation even in
the absence of substantial structural changes such as
those described above. This trend is determined pri-
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marily by domestic monetary and fiscal policy ac-
tions. Most analysts believe the current underlying
trend to be about 5 to 6 percent, approximately the
same as the trend growth of Ml. Policy actions in-
fluence the price trend by affecting the demand for
goods and services, given a stable underlying growth of
supply or potential output. Most structural wrenching
of the economny, on the other hand, directly affects
the supply of goods and services, and with given de-
mand, causes volatile short-run price fluctuations.
Fiscal and monetary policies represent the “macro”
approach to serious economic problems. Altering such
policies affects the demand for all goods and services.
A reduction in the supply of a particular good, such
as oil or soybeans, constitutes a “micro” economic
problem, which is best corrected by micro or struc-
tural economic policies. One result of a decline in
the supply of oil or soybeans is a rise in the price of
oil or soybeans relative to other goods. All that a
stimulative monetary or fiscal policy could do, in
such cases, is push up the absolute price of all goods
and services, leaving the relative price of oil and
soybeans unchanged. However, a structural policy
oriented toward increasing the supply of oil or soy-
beans could bring the relative prices of these com-
modities back into alignment.3
During the period in which relative prices of goods
and services are adjusting toward some equilibrium
value, relative rates of return on labor and nonlabor
inputs are also adjusting. Because there is not imme-
diate adjustment of factors of production to changes
in rates of return, unemployment of resources is
typically associated with this adjustment period. In-
deed, the sharp rise in unemployment in 1974 was
largely due to the severe structural shocks absorbed
by the economy over a relatively brief period of
time. Policymakers, recognizing the limited ability of
macroeconomic measures to eliminate structural un-
employment, adopted policies of moderation. This
has been more the case with regard to monetary than
fiscal policy.
Why might these policies be considered appropri-
ateP There are at least two explanations. One has to
do with the effect of such policy actions on the
economy independent of their effect on price antici-
pations and the other considers the impact with price
anticipations.
5
See the accompanying article by Denis S. Karnosky, “The
Link Between Money and Prices — 1971-76,” this issue of
the Review.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JUNE 1976
Stimulative Policies Assuming No Price
Expectations Effects
Ignoring for the moment the effect of stimulative
policies on price expectations, what would be the
implications of a doubling of both the actual budget
deficit and the rate of growth of the actual money
supply? First, because the entire economy is and has
been operating at less than capacity, unemployment
would fall at a faster pace than it would fall under
more moderate policies. Second, policymakers would
soon face the necessity of reversing their stimulative
policy actions. Given sharply declining unemploy-
ment, at what point should expansionary policies be
curtailed — 7 percent, 6 percent, 5 percent, 4 per-
cent, or at a 3 percent aggregate unemployment rate?
The fact is that no one knows with any high degree
of certainty the specific lags between policy change
and unemployment response. Nor is it known with
precision what rate of price increase is associated
with a particular unemployment rate. Because aggre-
gate unemployment measures of either labor or capital
resources are comprised of sectors in which capacity
utilization rates differ widely, shortages and rising
wages and prices can emerge quickly in bottleneck
areas under the lash of forceful macroeconomic pol-
icies. The capacity utilization measures themselves
often give contradictory signals as to just how much
slack exists at any time in the economy.
Finally, the track record of our policymakers in the
postwar period is not good with regard to an aware-
ness of when to cut back stimulative policies. In the
early 1960s, prominent economists professed the be-
lief that we had acquired the necessary knowledge
and the tools to “fine tune” the economy with just
the proper injection of, say, more government spend-
ing here and higher interest rates there, Historical
experience with upward ratcheting inflation rates in
the face of periodic recessions over the past fifteen
years has shown that we have no such knowledge or
that it has not been applied.
Stimulative Policies Assuming “Policy
Announcement” Price Expectations Effects
In recent years the Federal Reserve has become
more open in the announcement of its policy inten-
tions. In addition, the Federal Government, to include
the Congress, makes available for public scrutiny
its specific budget policy preferences. Many observ-
ers believe there is an important linkage between
policy statements, policy actions, and economic activ-
ity. Stimulative policy actions have come to be as-
sociated with inflationary pressures and restrictive
actions with periods of recession. Assuming that
stated policy preferences bear some relation to policy
actions, it is not too far-fetched to conjecture that an
important segment of the public includes policy an-
nouncements as an input into its expectations of the
future course of economic developments. In fact, a
body of literature is currently being amassed which
suggests that the public forms its expectations
“rationally” on the basis of currently available
economic information, which includes public policy
pronouncements.
If we accept the notion that policy statements in-
fluence the expectation of future inflation, what im-
pact would the announcement of, say, a money growth
rate and a Federal deficit twice the actual declared
targets, have had on such expectations last year?
Quite likely, given past experience with deficits,
money supply growth, and inflation rates, there would
have been a marked rise in inflationary expectations.
This could have been transmitted through the econ-
omyin numerous ways.
Mortgage and other lenders demand higher pre-
miums when faced with the expectation of higher
prices, thereby putting upward pressure on interest
rates. Union and nonunion workers are placing
greater emphasis on inflation escalator clauses in their
negotiations; the anticipation of further price hikes
could only strengthen their wage demands. Because
firms were hit hard in recent years by the impact
of inflation on profits due to their vulnerability to
higher inventory costs and inadequate depreciation
write-otIs, corporate officials are among those most
likely to give great attention to changes in macro-
policies and policy statements. Such officials would
likely attempt to protect themselves from the adverse
effects of inflation, and conceivably, further price
controls, by increasing prices.
With anticipations themselves forcing up prices,
the stabilization authorities would have to continue
any stimulative policy actions they might adopt in
order to validate the price and wage hikes, or risk
the outbreak of widespread unemployment by apply-
ing the monetary and fiscal brakes.
The long-run effects of higher price anticipations
are more difficult to forecast. There is little evidence
that consumers, over the long run, svill spend more
or that firms will invest more than otherwise in the
face of rapid inflation. In fact, the likelihood is that
so much energy and effort is put into beating infla-
tion, that productivity is adversely affected. Lower
productivity, given aggregate demand growth, means
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more inflation. In other words, there may be a vmcions
cycle associated with price anticipations, and the
realization of such anticipations, which must be
broken if the economic system is to continue to func-
tion in a viable manner.
OUTLOOK
Economic activity has bounced back from the re-
cent recession at a pace somewhat greater than
other postwar recoveries, and stronger than antici-
pated by many analysts. Strongly expansionary poli-
cies were not required to spur the recovery because
of the interplay of normal cyclical forces and the
cessation of hannful economic shocks. In fact, if
price expectations are affected by current macro-
economic policies, the adoption of moderate policy
measures was conducive to a strengthened recovery.
The recovery should continue at a healthy pace for
some time— in the absence of further shocks and
given policies oriented toward eliminating structural
deficiencies and curbing inflationary pressures. Some
progress has been made by eliminating price and
wage controls and by stimulating agricultural output,
but not much has been done to further energy
growth, or halt the growing network of government
regulations.
So fax as macroeconomic policies are concerned,
firms must be convinced that they will not again be
caught in an inflation-induced profit squeeze if they
are to increase substantially their capital expendi-
tures; and labor must be convinced that their wages
will not be eaten up by rapid price advances if
strikes and excessive wage settlements are to be
avoided. Continued large deficits and the resumption
of rapid monetary growth are inconsistent with such
objectives. They are consistent with a return toward
a path taken by a large number of inflation-plagued
countries throughout the world.
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